mises.org / Ryan McMaken on 06/29/2016
Yesterday, we looked at how the European Union functions on a model of “democracy” that is based on very large constituency sizes, thus reducing access to policymakers, and reducing the ability of ordinary taxpayers to influence the lawmaking process. (The more residents there are for each elected official, the larger the constituency size.)
An analysis of constituency size showed that there are far, far more constituents per elected official in the EU Parliament than is typically the case for national legislatures in Western Europe.
As Thornton et al. conclude:
[T]he evidence is very suggestive that constituency size provides an explanation for much of the trend, or upward drift in government spending, because of the fixed-sized nature of most legislatures. Potentially, constituency size could be adjusted to control the growth of government.
They note the reason for this appears to be diminished engagement between elected officials and constituents when constituency sizes are very large.